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Abstract
In this paper we use a dynamic structural life-cycle model to analyze the employment,
¯scal and welfare e®ects induced by unemployment insurance. The model features a detailed
speci¯cation of the tax and transfer system, including unemployment insurance bene¯ts
which depend on an individual's employment and earnings history. The model also captures
the endogenous accumulation of experience which impacts on future wages, job arrivals and
job separations. For better identi¯cation of the structural parameters we exploit a quasi-
natural experiment, namely reductions over time in the entitlement period for unemployment
insurance bene¯ts which varied by age and experience. The results show that a policy cut in
the generosity of unemployment insurance operationalized as a reduction in the entitlement
period generates a larger increase in employment and yields a bigger ¯scal saving than a cut
operationalized as a reduction in the replacement ratio. Welfare analysis of revenue neutral
tax and transfer reforms also favors a reduction in the entitlement period.
Keywords: Unemployment insurance, Replacement ratio, Entitlement period, Life-cycle
labor supply, Tax reform, Method of Simulated Moments.
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In many countries unemployment insurance is considered to be an important component of
the transfer system, providing income to unemployed individuals who have recently moved
out of employment. However, several governments have recently reduced the generosity of
their unemployment insurance schemes, with the dual objectives of increasing employment and
reducing social expenditure. We use a dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supply
to evaluate the employment, ¯scal and welfare e®ects induced by unemployment insurance.
Speci¯cally, we consider the e®ects of reductions in the generosity of unemployment insurance
brought about by changes to the two central dimensions of unemployment insurance, namely the
entitlement period and the replacement ratio. Our model includes a comprehensive speci¯cation
of the tax and transfer system, including unemployment insurance bene¯ts that are linked to
an individual's working history. The model captures transitions into and out of employment
occurring over the life-cycle and stochastic job arrivals and job separations. Finally we include
endogenous accumulation of experience which impacts on future wages, and job arrival and
separation rates.
By evaluating the design of unemployment insurance in a dynamic structural life-cycle model,
this study extends the previous empirical literature on unemployment insurance. Indeed, an im-
portant literature has been concerned with estimating the employment e®ects of unemployment
insurance using reduced form, typically quasi-experimental, methods. Following Meyer (1990)
numerous studies use regional or age speci¯c variation in the institutional design of unemploy-
ment insurance to identify the causal e®ects of the entitlement period and the replacement
ratio on the duration of unemployment. Examples include Katz and Meyer (1990) and Card
and Levine (2000) for the US and Hunt (1995), Lalive et al. (2006), Van Ours and Vodopivec
(2006), KyyrÄ a and Wilke (2007) and Caliendo et al. (2009) for Europe. These studies tend to
¯nd signi¯cant e®ects of the generosity of unemployment insurance on employment and, where
applicable, retirement. In this paper we gain additional insight into the e®ects of unemployment
insurance by leveraging our structural model.
The embedding of our analysis in a dynamic structural life-cycle model has three prominent
advantages relative to a reduced form approach. First, the economic model captures the complex
and varied incentives e®ects induced by unemployment insurance, as discussed in Mortensen
(1977). It follows that, using our parameter estimates, we are able to quantify the employment
e®ects caused by changes in unemployment insurance experienced by individuals with di®erent
employment histories and with di®erent distributions of o®ered wages. In particular, we are
able to separate out Mortensen's entitlement e®ect whereby a reduction in the generosity of
unemployment insurance makes unemployed individuals who have exhausted their entitlement to
unemployment insurance less likely to enter employment. Second, by exploiting the institutional
details concerning the tax and transfer system contained in the structural model, we are able
to derive the ¯scal costs of policy changes, taking into account both changes in the transfer
payments made to non-working individuals, and changes in the tax revenues received from those
in employment. Moreover, we are able to analyze revenue neutral changes in the entitlement
1period and the replacement ratio. Third, drawing on the speci¯cation of preferences in our
model, we can evaluate the welfare e®ects of policy changes. This allows us to move beyond an
assessment of employment e®ects, and to look also at changes in well-being induced by reforms
to the system of unemployment insurance.
Policy evaluations based on structural models are sometimes treated with skepticism as
identi¯cation of the parameters is often not transparent (Keane and Wolpin, 2009). Recent con-
tributions by Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Attanasio et al. (2005) propose using a randomized
experiment to provide validation or clearer identi¯cation of the central structural parameters
in dynamic life-cycle models. We follow this idea and propose an identi¯cation strategy which
supplements cross correlations between endogenous variables and correlations between endoge-
nous variables and exogenous variables with variation obtained from a quasi-natural experiment.
Speci¯cally, we exploit changes in the institutional design of unemployment insurance over time
which varied by age and working history. Therefore, we make use of the variation on which sev-
eral of the aforementioned reduced form studies rely.1 In this respect our paper also contributes
to the growing literature which tries to combine the advantages of the reduced form analysis
with structural modeling.2
In order to analyze the employment, ¯scal and welfare e®ects of the design of unemployment
insurance in a dynamic structural model we must generalize existing dynamic structural life-
cycle models of labor supply with endogenous accumulation of experience, e.g., Eckstein and
Wolpin (1989), by incorporating a detailed speci¯cation of the tax and transfer system. On the
tax side, we model the taxation of labor and non-labor income and we account for employee and
employer social security contributions. In terms of transfers, an unemployed individual receives
either social assistance, i.e., a means-tested transfer to raise income to the universal minimum
income, or non means-tested unemployment insurance bene¯ts, which are tied to the individual's
recent employment history and previous earnings. The entitlement period for unemployment
insurance depends on experience and age. Thus, in addition to capturing the dependence of
wages on endogenously accumulated experience, as in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), our life-cycle
model accounts for the e®ect of previous employment and previous earnings on the transfers
received by unemployed individuals.
A small number of papers have included transfers paid to unemployed individuals within a
dynamic structural life-cycle model of labor supply. Among others, Wolpin (1992) and Adda
et al. (2009) include a speci¯cation of unemployment insurance bene¯ts, and Adda et al. (2007)
include both unemployment insurance bene¯ts and means-tested social assistance.3 The anal-
ysis undertaken in this study extends the previous literature in several respects. Notably, we
1See Hunt (1995) and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2009) for Germany and Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) for
Slovenia.
2A recent example is Novo and Silva (2010) who provide validation for a calibrated structural search model
by using changes in the entitlement period for unemployment insurance in Portugal. While the quasi-natural
experiment is similar in our application, the models di®er in many aspects. Most importantly, we estimate the
structural parameters driving life-cycle behavior instead of using calibration.
3Additionally, several studies follow Rust and Phelan (1997) and analyze retirement behavior in a dynamic
structural life-cycle setting. These papers account for the relevant aspects of the pension system.
2utilize a more realistic speci¯cation of the household budget constraint. With respect to the
modeling of out-of-work transfers, we include both unemployment insurance and means-tested
social assistance. Moreover, in contrast to Adda et al. (2007), we allow the entitlement period
for unemployment insurance to depend on the individual's age and working history.4 We argue
that this detailed modeling of the ¯scal incentives is necessary to capture correctly labor supply
incentives which vary according to wage, age and experience.
Our model further includes a number of empirically relevant features. First, dependent on
age and health status, an individual has a probability of being able to access early retirement
and, subject to having access, he or she can decide to retire before the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years. Second, we allow for several sources of non-stationarity over the life-cycle due
to the e®ects of age, health and endogenously accumulated experience. Speci¯cally, all three
variables feature in the job arrival rate, the job separation rate and the wage o®er distribution.
Furthermore, pensions and unemployment insurance rules vary according to age and experience,
and access to early retirement varies by age and health status. Finally, we allow for heterogeneity
in job arrival and job separation rates, preferences and wages due to unobserved individual
characteristics.
This paper is related to several studies which estimate structural search models in order to
quantify the employment e®ects of unemployment insurance e.g., van den Berg (1990), Ferrall
(1997) and Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006). Common to all these studies is that they focus
exclusively on the transition out of unemployment for an in°ow sample of unemployed individuals
or school drop-outs. The samples used in these studies therefore consist of individuals who are
homogenous in terms of their entitlement to unemployment insurance. In contrast, we model
multiple transitions between employment states occurring over the life-cycle and can distinguish
between individuals with di®erent accumulated entitlement periods for unemployment insurance.
Similar to e.g., Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and French (2005), we use the Method of
Simulated Moments (MSM) to estimate our dynamic structural life-cycle model. The empirical
analysis is based on a thirteen year panel of single men and women without dependent children
taken from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP). This data set contains detailed income
and demographic information and follows employment behavior on a monthly basis. In the
empirical analysis we account for all major aspects of the German tax and transfer legislation.
During the sample period 1995 - 2007 several large scale tax reforms changed working incentives
either by decreasing marginal tax rates or social security contributions or by changing the design
of out-of-work transfers. As mentioned above, we use this variation, in particular changes in
the entitlement period for unemployment insurance, to improve identi¯cation of the structural
parameters.
Using our structural model we are able to ¯t the salient features of the sample including
the patterns of labor supply and retirement behavior over the life-cycle, the distribution of
o®ered wages and the exit rates from employment and unemployment. The structural parameter
estimates are used to compare the employment, ¯scal and welfare e®ects of cuts in the entitlement
4The entitlement period for unemployment insurance depends on age in numerous countries including Austria,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea and Portugal.
3period and cuts in the replacement ratio. In summary, when the policy maker wants to reduce
the generosity of unemployment insurance, our results favor cutting the entitlement period
rather than the replacement ratio; cutting the entitlement period provides a larger ¯scal saving,
induces more employment and leads to a smaller increase in early retirement than cutting the
replacement ratio. Welfare analysis also favors cuts in the entitlement period over cuts in the
replacement ratio.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our model of labor supply over the life-
cycle. Section 3 details the adopted empirical speci¯cation. In Section 4 we list the selection
criteria which determine our sample of single adult households taken from the SOEP, and provide
a descriptive analysis of observed labor supply and retirement behavior. In Section 5 we detail the
estimation method and discuss identi¯cation. In Section 6 we presents our structural parameter
estimates and assess the model's goodness of ¯t, and in Section 7 we use the estimated structural
parameters to evaluate the employment, welfare and ¯scal e®ects of policy changes to the design
of unemployment insurance. Section 8 concludes the paper with a discussion of the broader
implications of our results for policy makers.
2 Model
2.1 Overview of the model
In order to analyze the employment, ¯scal and welfare e®ects induced by the design of unem-
ployment insurance we derive and estimate a dynamic structural life-cycle model with three
labor market states, namely full-time employment, f, unemployment, u, and retirement, r.5 We
propose a discrete time, ¯nite horizon model in which job arrivals, job separations and labor
supply choices occur at quarterly intervals. We assume that the maximum life-time is 78 years
and compulsory retirement occurs at age 65 years. Individuals are indexed by i = 1;:::;N and
quarters of calender time are indexed by t.
We model only the life-cycle labor supply of single adult households without dependent
children. We focus on individuals aged 40 years and above and reasonably assume that family
composition is constant over the individual's future life. It is assumed that men and women
aged over 40 years have ¯nished their education, and all analysis is conditioned on educational
quali¯cations obtained prior to age 40 years. Finally, as is common in this literature, e.g., Rust
and Phelan (1997), we assume that individuals do not save and are credit constrained.6 In a
more general model, in addition to the tax and transfer system, precautionary savings would
provide insurance by allowing intertemporal consumption smoothing, e.g., Low et al. (2009). In
such a setting households are less dependent on the transfer system and therefore any behavioral
e®ects induced by changes in unemployment insurance are likely to be lower. Therefore, our
5While retirement is not the focus of this paper, we include retirement in the model as early retirement is
common in practice and treating individuals who enter retirement before the age of compulsory retirement as
unemployed is likely to bias downwards estimates of the employment e®ects of unemployment insurance.
6French (2005) is one of the few examples that allows for saving in a structural life-cycle model of retirement.
4estimates of the behavioral e®ects induced by changes in unemployment insurance should be
interpreted as upper bounds.
Our selection criteria have been chosen partly to limit the complexity of the empirical analy-
sis. However, this population is of central interest when studying the e®ects of di®erent systems
of unemployment insurance. In general, single adult households are relatively dependent on the
transfer system as they cannot rely on the income of other household members. Further, by
following individuals up to the age of compulsory retirement we are able to determine the extent
to which the design of unemployment insurance contributes to the high rates of unemployment
among older individuals.
2.2 Labor market transitions
Transitions between labor market states depend on the one hand on the structure of the labor
market, and on the other hand on individuals' preferences for income and leisure and on their ex-
pectations of future income and future labor supply behavior. The structure of the labor market
is de¯ned by the job arrival and job separation rates, retirement possibilities, the distribution
of o®ered wages and the tax and transfers system, which determines the net income associated
with each labor market state. We simplify the search process and assume that all unemployed
individuals have a constant job search intensity. Implicitly, this implies that an individual has
a single choice variable, his or her current labor market state, and each period this is optimized
so as to maximizes the value of expected discounted future utility. In the following we describe
the processes whereby individuals can make transitions between labor market states.
2.2.1 Retirement possibilities
When an individual enters the labor market following the completion of full-time education
he or she is not eligible for early retirement. However, an employed or unemployed individual
has a probability ¤i;t = ©(¸xXR
i;t) of becoming eligible for early retirement at time t, where
¸x is a parameter vector and XR
i;t is a vector of individual characteristics including age terms
and health status.7 Here and henceforth ©() denotes the cumulative distribution function for a
standard normal random variable. Once eligible for early retirement the individual keeps this
status for the rest of his or her life. Retirement is modeled as an absorbing state; once retired,
an individual cannot make a transition into employment or unemployment.8
We argue that this speci¯cation of the eligibility for early retirement provides a good ap-
proximation to the complex reality of the German retirement system. In Germany transitions
into retirement are possible before the age of compulsory retirement. Eligibility for early retire-
ment depends primarily on health status, gender, age and working history, however ¯rm speci¯c
circumstance and agreements can also a®ect an individual's eligibility for early retirement. As
the ¯rm speci¯c factors that in°uence retirement possibilities do not feature in our data set it
is not possible to derive precisely an individual's eligibility for early retirement.
7As discussed in Appendix II, health status is not a choice variable but evolves stochastically over the life-cycle.
8This assumption is in line with the German legislation and is supported strongly by the data.
52.2.2 Transitions out of unemployment
In each period t, every unemployed individual receives with probability £i;t = ©(µxXi;t + ¹µ
i)
an o®er of a full-time job. The job arrival probability depends on age, experience and region
of residence9, collectively denoted by Xi;t, and on an individual speci¯c unobservable ¹µ
i which
will be speci¯ed below. The gross wage associated with this job arrival is denoted wi;t. An
unemployed individual in receipt of a job arrival must choose between rejecting the job arrival
and remaining unemployed, and accepting the job arrival, in which case he or she makes a
transition into employment. Those currently eligible for early retirement additionally have the
option of making a permanent move into retirement. Unemployed individuals face one-o® costs
cuf each time they make a transition into employment. These costs may be pecuniary, e.g.,
having to purchase clothes or equipment when starting a job, or non-pecuniary, e.g., habit
formation. In either case, these transition costs can be described as state dependence e®ects, see
Hyslop (1999).10 With probability (1 ¡ £i;t) an unemployed individual does not receive a job
arrival and thus a transition into employment is not possible. However, if eligible the individual
can move into retirement.11
2.2.3 Transitions out of employment
Each period an employed individual experiences a job separation with probability ¡i;t = ©(°xXi;t+
¹
°
i ) which again depends on observed characteristics, Xi;t, and individual speci¯c unobservables,
¹
°
i . If the individual experiences a separation and is not currently eligible for early retirement
then he or she must make a transition into unemployment. However, if eligible for early re-
tirement he or she must choose between unemployment and early retirement. With probability
(1 ¡ ¡i;t) the employed individual does not experience a separation at time t and, assuming no
eligibility for early retirement, he or she can choose between staying in employment with a gross
wage of wi;t and making a transition into unemployment. Retirement is an additional option
for those individuals who are currently eligible. Again, we allow state dependence or transition
costs cfu that are incurred when an individual moves from employment to unemployment.
The individual speci¯c unobservables ¹µ
i and ¹
°
i are assumed to be random e®ects that are
jointly normally distributed with zero means, variances ¾2
¹µ and ¾2
¹° respectively and a covariance
Cov¹µ¹°.
9In the empirical analysis region of residence consists of either east or west Germany. The labor market
conditions are worse in east Germany than in the west.
10In a di®erent application of dynamic structural life-cycle modeling, Keane and Wolpin (1997) report that
transition costs, which they term mobility costs, were necessary to ¯t accurately the degree of persistence in
occupational choices.
11Given the limited information in the data set we cannot observe job-to-job transitions. Therefore, we cannot
model on-the-job search or distinguish between general and ¯rm speci¯c human capital.
62.3 Financial rewards and labor market status
In contrast to most previous studies of employment behavior over the life-cycle, we assume that
individuals make employment and retirement decisions based on net rather than gross income.
Our model therefore includes a detailed speci¯cation of the tax and transfer system which maps
from gross labor income and non-labor income12, demographic characteristics, employment and
earnings histories to net incomes in full-time employment, unemployment and retirement. We
argue that net incomes are the most accurate way to describe work incentives (see also Laroque
and Salanie, 2002). Working with net incomes further allows us to derive the e®ects on the
government's net revenue position of a policy change and to compare revenue neutral policy
changes. This study uses the German tax and transfer system as a benchmark. The main
features of this system are noted here while Appendix I provides a more detailed description
together with information concerning recent relevant changes to the system.13
2.3.1 Net income in full-time employment
Individual i's net income if he or she works full-time at time t takes the following form
mi;f;t = Ff(wi;t;Ii;t;TSt): (1)
Net income in full-time employment depends on the o®ered gross wage wi;t, non-labor income
Ii;t, and the tax and transfer system of the given period TSt. The tax and transfer system
determines social security contributions and income tax deductions.
2.3.2 Net income in unemployment
The net income of an unemployed individual whose last period of employment was at time s is
determined as follows
mi;u;t = Fu (EPi;t;ELi;t;Ii;t;mi;f;s;TSt): (2)
In the above EPi;t denotes the months of unemployment insurance bene¯ts the individual is
entitled to at time t and ELi;t is an indicator for the individual being eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance at time t. Eligible individuals receive non means-tested unemployment insurance
bene¯ts. Speci¯cally, eligible individuals who have positive months of entitlement receive unem-
ployment insurance bene¯ts known as ALG I14 and equal to 60% of the net income in their most
recent job, mi;f;s. Until 2005, those who exhausted their entitlement to ALG I received a second
12We assume that each individual has an initial endowment of assets which remains constant and they receive
capital income depending on the year speci¯c rate of return.
13Restricting attention to single adult households without dependent children simpli¯es greatly the modeling of
the tax and transfer system as the family related components of the legislation, such as the joint income taxation
of married couples and child related transfers, do not need to be considered.
14The names of the transfer programs changed in course of the transfer reform in 2005. For simplicity, we use
ALG I and ALH to refer to transfers which are dependent on previous earnings or employment, and use ALG II
to refer to the minimum income component.
7type of unemployment insurance bene¯ts known as ALH which were paid at a lower rate of
53% and continued inde¯nitely. An individual who is not entitled to unemployment insurance,
or whose net income after receiving unemployment insurance is su±ciently low, receives social
assistance (ALG II). Social assistance payments are a non time-limited transfer which raises the
individual's net income up to the universal minimum income.
The tax and transfer system in°uences the entitlement period for unemployment insurance
bene¯ts in two ways. First, the rules dictate a maximum entitlement period, which varies
discontinuously according to age. Second, individuals accumulate entitlement to unemployment
insurance at a rate of one month for every two months of employment. Individuals who leave
unemployment before they have exhausted their entitlement to unemployment insurance carry
forward their remaining entitlement. Hence, only individuals with su±ciently long working
histories have the maximum entitlement period; actual entitlement periods for unemployed
individuals who are part way through a spell of unemployment and for employed individuals
who have recently been unemployed are lower than the maximum entitlement, and potentially
zero. Appendix I provides further details concerning the age speci¯c maximum entitlement
periods for unemployment insurance. Eligibility for unemployment insurance is determined
when the individual starts a spell of unemployment and does not change over the course of
the unemployment spell. To be eligible for unemployment insurance an individual must have
worked at least one year during the previous three years, or from 2005 two years, prior to entering
unemployment.
In theory, those who voluntarily choose to move into unemployment are not eligible for
unemployment insurance for the ¯rst three months of their unemployment spell. However, in
reality it is very di±cult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separations. Therefore
we assume that all unemployed individuals are eligible to receive unemployment insurance from
the start of their unemployment spell. In our model individuals can change their employment
behavior only at a quarterly intervals and therefore this assumptions a®ects only the ¯rst quarter
of the unemployment spell.
2.3.3 Net income in retirement
We approximate the net income in retirement in the following way
mi;r;t = Fr (PIi;t;Ii;t;TSi;t): (3)
where PIi;t denotes the total pensionable income accumulated by individual i over his or her
working life up to time t. In any given month, the pensionable income of a working individual
consists of the individual's gross earnings, while the pensionable income of an unemployed indi-
vidual is the value of any unemployment insurance bene¯ts received. We approximate pension
income as 60% of the individual's pensionable income averaged over the maximum working life,
and impose a cap of 2000 Euros per month. Finally we assume that individuals with pension in-
come less than the minimum income receive social assistance to raise their income in retirement
8up to this level.15
2.4 Optimal labor supply over the life-cycle
By drawing on dynamic programming techniques, we use our model to describe optimal employ-
ment and retirement behavior over the life-cycle in a forward looking setting where the individual
considers the dependence of payo®s occurring in the future on his or her current labor supply de-
cision. There are several mechanisms linking today's employment and retirement decision with
future payo®s. Employment in the current quarter increases an individual's experience which
impacts on future job arrival and job separation rates and leads to higher expected future wage
o®ers, assuming positive returns to experience. Two additional intertemporal linkages occur
through unemployment insurance bene¯ts. First, employment in the current period increases
the duration of entitlement to unemployment insurance payments, thus increasing the value of
unemployment in the future. Second, wage based rewards to human capital accumulation mean
that current employment leads to higher future unemployment insurance bene¯ts. A forward
looking model is required to capture how individuals respond to the dynamic incentives presented
by the accumulation of experience and the tax and transfer system. For example, our forward
looking model recognizes that an individual may choose to have a spell of unemployment, during
which he or she claims generous unemployment insurance bene¯ts, prior to entering retirement.
A myopic model, in contrast, would not recognize that unemployment insurance bene¯ts may
provide a stepping stone from employment into retirement.
An individual's life-cycle utility can be expressed in terms of the state speci¯c value functions
V
j
t (si;t) for j = f;u;r. The state variables si;t consist of all variables a®ecting the contempora-
neous utilities, the job arrival rate, £i;t, the job separation rate, ¡i;t, the probability of having
access to early retirement, ¤i;t, and the o®ered wage, wi;t. At time t, the individual is assumed
to know the current value of si;t but may not know the values of all or some elements of si;t+k
for k > 0. However, the distribution of si;t+1 is known to the individual at time t and is assumed
to depend only on si;t. The value function associated with full-time employment is de¯ned as
discounted value of the individual's expected life-time utility if he or she works full-time in the
current quarter and makes optimal labor supply and retirement decisions in all subsequent quar-
ters. The value function for unemployment is similarly de¯ned. The value function associated
with retirement is de¯ned as the discounted value of the individual's expected life-time utility
if he or she enters retirement in the current quarter and stays in retirement for the remainder
of his or her life.
15In practice, individuals have various sources of pension income including state pensions, private pensions and
income from ¯rm-speci¯c pension plans. The state pension is by far the most important source of pension income.
State pension payments are determined by pension points accumulated over the working life together with yearly
point values. Our chosen approximation of the pension system is less complex. However, we allow pension income
to depend on employment behavior over the whole working life and therefore capture the most relevant feature
of the pension system for our analysis.
9The state speci¯c value functions are de¯ned recursively as follows
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t (si;t) = Ui;r;t + ±EtV r
i;t+1: (6)
In the above Ui;j;t denotes the individual's °ow utility associated with state j at time t and ±
denotes the discount factor. The discount factor is a crucial parameter in the life-cycle optimiza-
tion problem as it describes how strongly expected future utility a®ects the individual's current
choice. In the empirical analysis we follow the literature and assume an annualized discount
factor of 0.96.16
The individual maximizes his or her life-cycle utility subject to a budget constraint. Since
in our framework individuals neither save nor borrow, the budget for consumption equals state
speci¯c net income. We assume that the individual has full information about the tax and trans-
fer system in the current period but does not anticipate future changes in the tax and transfer
system. Therefore, we solve for optimal labor supply behavior assuming that individuals expect
that the current tax and transfer system will prevail inde¯nitely. Optimizing behavior on the
part of an unemployed individual in receipt of a job o®er or an employed individual who is not
subject to a job separation implies that the individual will choose employment if and only if
V
f
i;t(si;t) ¸ V u




then the individual will choose unemployment. If the individual has the option of early retire-
ment then he or she will work full-time if and only if V
f
i;t(si;t) ¸ V u
i;t(si;t) and V
f
i;t(si;t) ¸ V r
i;t(si;t),
will be unemployed if and only if V u
i;t(si;t) > V
f
i;t(si;t) and V u
i;t(si;t) ¸ V r
i;t(si;t), and otherwise
the individual will move into retirement. A previously employed individual who experiences a
separation at time t or an unemployed individual who does not receive a job o®er will choose
retirement if V r
i;t(si;t) ¸ V u
i;t(si;t), providing that he or she has access to early retirement, and
otherwise will be unemployed. At age 65 all remaining non-retired individuals must enter com-
pulsory retirement.
3 Empirical speci¯cation and implementation
In the following we discuss the speci¯cations of the °ow utilities and the distribution of o®ered
wages, and the treatment of the initial conditions. This supplements the speci¯cations of the
job arrival and job separation rates which where presented in Section 2.2, and the speci¯cation
of the health equation detailed in Appendix II.
16Magnac and Thesmar (2002) discuss identi¯cation of the discount factor in dynamic discrete choice models.
103.1 Flow utilities

















In the above mi;f;t, mi;u;t and mi;r;t denote the individual's net income in full-time employment,
unemployment and retirement respectively. ´i describes the degree of complementarity between
consumption and leisure and thus provides information about the reservation wage or the share
of net income necessary to compensate the individual for the disutility of work. We allow for
heterogeneity in the complementarity and assume that ´i » N(¹´;¾2
´). To guarantee that all
individuals enjoy positive utility from leisure time ´i is truncated from above 1. ´i is also
truncated from below at zero to ensure that °ow utility is represented by a real valued function.
The variables yi;u;t¡1 and yi;f;t¡1 are indicators of unemployment and full-time employment in
the previous quarter and therefore cuf and cfu represent state dependence e®ects or transition
costs associated with moving between unemployment and employment and vice versa. The
state dependence parameters multiply the net incomes in the °ow utilities and therefore these
parameters may be interpreted as shares of net income. ½ describes the concavity of the utility
function; we follow the previous literature and assume that individuals are risk averse, and set
½ = 1:5.17 ¯y determines the importance of consumption in the utility function, relative to the
unobservables "i;f;t, "i;u;t and "i;r;t. The unobservables "i;f;t, "i;u;t and "i;r;t are assumed to be
mutually independent and independent over time. Additionally, "i;j;t for all i, j and t is assumed
to have a type I extreme value distribution. At time t individual i knows the current values of
"i;j;t for j = f;u;r but has no information about the future values of these unobservables.
3.2 Gross wages
Individual i's log o®ered gross wage is assumed to evolve according to
log(wi;t) = ¸zzi;t + ®w
i + Ài;t: (10)
In the above zi;t are observed individual characteristics that a®ect wages including education,
region of residence, experience and experience squared. The coe±cients on the experience terms
capture the e®ect of human capital accumulated via previous employment on an individual's
wage. Ài;t is a shock to individual i's wage occurring at time t and is assumed to be independent
of observed individual characteristics, to occur independently over time and to be normally
distributed with zero mean and variance ¾2
À. Individual i is assumed to know the current
17See Laibson et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion of the di±culties of identifying the coe±cient of relative
risk aversion.
11value of Ài;t but does not know the future values of the time varying shocks to wages. ®w
i
is a time invariant individual speci¯c random e®ect assumed to be known to the individual
and unconditional normally distributed with zero mean and variance ¾2
®w. Wages are observed
only for working individuals and therefore wage observations are subject to selectivity. In the
econometric analysis we account for this selection process by modeling employment and wages
jointly. Non-labor income and intertemporal and cross sectional variation in net income induced
by the tax and transfer system a®ect the employment process but not the distribution of o®ered
wages and therefore provide exclusion restrictions for identi¯cation of the parameters in the
wage equation.
3.3 Initial conditions
The dynamic nature of our model implies that we cannot treat the initial sample observations of
experience and labor market status as exogenous with respect to the individual's labor supply
choices during the sample period. To account for the endogeneity of the initial conditions we
follow Heckman (1981) and use a reduced form model to approximate labor supply behavior
prior to entering the sample, and allow the unobservables a®ecting the initial observations to be
correlated with the random e®ects appearing in the °ow utilities, the job arrival and separation
rates and the wage equation. While Heckman (1981) proposed a probit model for the initial state,
we generalize this to account for the endogeneity of both the initial state and initial experience,
and to allow retirement to be the initial state. Speci¯cally, we use a reduced form dynamic
multinomial probit model to approximate labor supply and retirement behavior between entering
the labor market, assumed to occur when the individual ¯nished full-time education, and entering
the sample. The data generation process for behavior prior to entering the sample is based on
three indices IEi;¿, IUi;¿ and IRi;¿, which collectively determine if an individual is employed,
unemployed or retired at time ¿, where ¿ indexes all periods between the individual leaving
full-time education and entering the sample. More precisely, an individual is employed at time
¿ if IEi;¿ ¸ IUi;¿ and IEi;¿ ¸ IRi;¿, is unemployed if IUi;¿ > IEi;¿ and IUi;¿ ¸ IRi;¿ and is
retired otherwise. We model retirement as an absorbing state, hence any individual who retires
prior to entering the sample cannot subsequently move into employment or unemployment.
In the empirical implementation, the index IEi;¿ is a linear function of observed characteris-





i and ´i, and an error term ²I
i;f;¿. The second index IRi;¿ is a linear function of
age terms and an error term ²I
i;r;¿ while, for identi¯cation purposes, the third index IUi;¿ depends
only on an error term ²I
i;u;¿. The three error terms are mutually independent, independent over
time and individuals and are drawn from a standard normal distribution.
3.4 Value function approximation
We approximate the value function using recursive simulation and interpolation. We start with
a grid of state space points for age 64.75 years. The state space variables are then updated to
the age 65 years values in accordance with the stochastic evolution of the variables as speci¯ed
12by the structural model. We evaluate the age 65 years value function at our grid of age 65 years
state space points. Ordinary least Squares (OLS) regression is used to express the expected age
65 years value function in terms of state space variables known at age 64.75 years. Next, we
move back one quarter to age 64.5 years, update the state space variables, and compute the
three age 64.75 years labor market state speci¯c value functions. We replace the expected age
65 years value function appearing in the state speci¯c value functions with the approximation
obtained in the previous step. The maximum of the three state speci¯c age 64.75 years value
functions is regressed on state space variables known at age 64.5 years. The regression results
relates the age 64.5 years state space points to the expected maximum of the three age 64.75
years state speci¯c value functions. We continue in this way until we reach age 40 years. This
procedure is repeated for each of the 13 di®erent tax and transfer systems operational during
the sample period to capture the year speci¯c aspects of the ¯scal legislation.
One of the main challenges when approximating the value function is to capture accurately
the labor supply incentives created by the accumulation of experience and complex dependence
of unemployment insurance bene¯ts on an individual's working history. Depending on age,
an individual's entitlement to unemployment insurance depends on working behavior over the
past 3-8 years, while experience can range between zero and 47 years. Thus, with employment
measured at quarterly intervals, the state space is extremely large. In order to approximate
accurately the dependence of the value function on an individual's working history we include
as explanatory variables in the OLS regressions experience and squared experience and a large
number of ¯ner measures of working behavior over the last 8 years. Regarding the latter, we
translate the working history in the last 8 years into a set of 5 variables which collectively
summarize the aspects of recent working behavior that are relevant to unemployment insurance
bene¯ts. Specially, the summary variables take the form of the entitlement period corresponding
to the working history in counterfactual regimes in which the maximum entitlement periods are
6, 12, 18, 26 and 32 months. We discretize these ¯ve summary variables and include in the
OLS regression a dummy variable for each value of each of the summary variables. The OLS
regressions also include net income in employment and this variable interacted with the all of the
included measures of employment history, observed and unobserved characteristics and currently
accumulated pension rights. Furthermore the coe±cients on all variables are allowed to vary
according to the current employment status. In total the OLS regression includes 178 regressors
and we use a grid with 7000 state space points.
4 Data and descriptive evidence
This study draws on data from the SOEP which is an annual representative panel survey of
over 11,000 households living in Germany and contains information about working behavior,
socio-economic variables and income from all sources at the individual and household levels.18
We construct an unbalanced panel of individuals with consecutive observations in at least two
quarters between 1996 - 2008 inclusive which yields retrospective information for the ¯scal years
18For a detailed description of the SOEP data set, see Haisken De-New and Frick (2005).
131995 - 2007.19 In our analysis we focus on a sample of single adult households in which the
household head is aged between 40 and 65 years and reports living without dependent children
at the time of the interview.20 We exclude individuals whose primary earnings are from self-
employment as well as those in full-time education as, in both cases, labor supply behavior
di®ers substantially from that of the rest of the population of interest. These exclusions yield a
sample with 33883 person-quarter observations corresponding to 2126 di®erent single individuals
of whom 1150 are women and 976 men. The median number of observations per individual is
12 quarters and around 25% of the individuals are observed for 6 or more years.
4.1 Employment and retirement behavior
The SOEP data set includes detailed information about employment and retirement behavior
in each month of the year prior to the interview date. For tractability, we group the monthly
information for each individual to form quarterly observations with the individual's labor market
state in the ¯rst month of the quarter determining the quarterly outcome. In this analysis we dis-
tinguish between employment, assumed to be full-time work, unemployment and retirement.21
Individuals who report su±cient income from pensions are classi¯ed as retired. A measure of
experience at the time that the individual entered the sample is constructed from retrospective
information concerning the individual's working history. This variable is then updated at quar-
terly intervals over the sample period in accordance with the individual's observed employment
behavior. At age 65 years all remaining non-retired workers are reclassi¯ed as retired.
Figure 1 shows the shares of employment, unemployment and retirement by age separately
for men and women and by region of residence, i.e., east or west Germany. In general, the
behavior of the various subgroups is similar. Until the age of 55 years employment rates are
fairly high and decline to zero over the last 10 years of the working life. Before age 55 years the
majority of the non-work corresponds to unemployment whereas retirement increases markedly
after age 60 years. Employment rates for men and women are quite similar. This is not surprising
since our sample consists only of single individuals without dependent children. A di®erence by
gender only becomes visible at the end of the working life. In particular, women tend to retire
earlier than men. As expected, by region of residence we ¯nd strong di®erences: averaged over
the whole age distribution, the employment rate is 10 percentage points higher in west Germany,
and older east Germans have a higher propensity to retire than west Germans of the same age.
These di®erences are likely to be related to the worse economic conditions in east Germany.
For men and women in both parts of Germany unemployment rates peak at around age
60 years and decline thereafter. This pattern may re°ect older individuals optimally using
unemployment as a stepping stone into retirement. Indeed, older individuals are likely to be
eligible for early retirement, and for eligible individuals there is no risk of a large reduction in
19The German ¯scal year commences on 1
st January.
20We allow for di®erent marital status and dependent children before the ¯rst sample observation when esti-
mating the initial conditions. See Section 3.3.
21Given our sample selection criteria, only around 5% of the population under study works fewer than 30 hours
per week and therefore it is reasonable to treat all employment as full-time work.









































































































































the future income when unemployment insurance runs out as they can make a transition into
retirement and receive income from a pension.22 Unemployment is less attractive for those who
are not eligible for early retirement, likely to be younger individuals, as they will be subject to
a large drop income if they have not accepted a job before their entitlement to unemployment
insurance runs out.
4.2 Gross wages
The SOEP data set includes the gross earnings in the month prior to the interview date. Using
the corresponding working hours, including hours of payed over-time work, we construct an
hourly wage measure. For time-consistency we cannot use the retrospective employment infor-
mation and the current wage information from the same survey wave. Instead, we make use of
the panel dimension of the data: as we observe the exact interview date we can match the wage
information collected in one year to the corresponding quarter of the retrospective employment
information collected in the next year. We do not observe the wage for individuals who were not
working in the month prior to the interview, in quarters in which the individual was not surveyed
or for those who failed to respond to all of the relevant survey questions. In the econometric
analysis we account for all three sources of missing wage observations as described in Haan and
Prowse (2010).
22In principle, in order to continue receiving unemployment insurance an older unemployed individual needs to
be searching for a job and ready to take up a job. However in reality it is very unlikely the workers older than 60
years get job o®ers which they are forced to take up by the employment o±ce.
155 Estimation strategy and identi¯cation
5.1 The Method of Simulated Moments
The parameters appearing in the job arrival and job separation rates, preferences, gross wages
and the initial conditions are estimated jointly using the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM):
parameters are chosen to minimize the distance between a set of moments pertaining to the
values of the endogenous variables, namely wages and labor supply behavior, as observed in the
sample and the average values of the same moments in a number of simulated data sets.
Estimation proceeds as follows. R data sets with the same empirical distribution of ex-
ogenous individual characteristics as in the sample are constructed. Using a particular vector
of parameters, denoted µ, labor supply outcomes and wages are simulated for each individual
in each of the R data sets.23 In more detail, values of the time invariant unobservables are
drawn for each individual. Next, conditioning on the exogenous variables, each individual's la-
bor supply behavior for the period between leaving full-time education and entering the sample
is simulated using the above speci¯cation of the initial conditions. This provides a simulated
initial labor market state for each individual as well as simulated values of each individual's
initial experience, initial entitlement to unemployment insurance, total pensionable income up
to the time of entering the sample and net income in his or her most recent job. Finally, starting
from the simulated initial values of the endogenous variables and using the structural model we
simulate a labor market state for each individual in each quarter during the sample period.
Let Ms denote the vector of moments computed from the sample observations and Mr(µ) for
r = 1;:::;R denote the same moments computed using the Rth simulated data set. The metric




















where b ­ is a weighting matrix. We follow Pischke (1995) and use a weighting matrix equal to
1=N times the inverse of the variances of the sample moments.24 b ­ is estimated using bootstrap
resampling of individuals from the original data set. The MSM estimator minimizes the distance





appearing in J(µ) is not a continuous function of the parameter vector µ as small changes in
µ cause discrete changes in labor supply behavior for some individuals. Consequently gradient
and Hessian based optimization methods are unsuitable methods for minimizing J(µ). Instead
we use Simulated Annealing in the form suggested by Go®e et al. (1994) to solve for the MSM
estimates.
23The results presented below were obtained using R = 10.
24We choose not to weight by the inverse covariance matrix in order to minimize possible ¯nite sample biases
of the form discussed by Altonji and Segal (1996).
165.2 Chosen moments and identi¯cation
In Appendix III we provide a detailed presentation of the chosen moments including the number
of moments and information about which parameter is primarily identi¯ed by each moment. In
this section we make some more general comments pertaining to identi¯cation and discuss how
we use moments based on a quasi-natural experiment to strengthen identi¯cation.
Among others, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2009) discuss the identi¯cation of structural models
and outline the necessary assumptions to identify the structural parameters. In general, given as-
sumptions about agents' rationality and beliefs, cross correlations between endogenous variables
and correlations between endogenous variables and exogenous variables are su±cient for iden-
ti¯cation. However, policy evaluations based on structural models are sometimes treated with
skepticism as identi¯cation of the parameters is often not transparent. The recent contributions
by Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Attanasio et al. (2005) propose using a randomized experi-
ment for validation or improved identi¯cation of the central structural parameters in dynamic
life-cycle models. We follow the idea of Attanasio et al. (2005) and suggest an identi¯cation
strategy which exploits additionally moments based on variation generated by changes in the in-
stitutional design of unemployment insurance, namely a reduction in the maximum entitlement
period which was introduced in April 1997.25
Section 2.3.2 above described the process whereby individuals accumulate entitlement to
unemployment insurance. In April 1997 the maximum entitlement period for unemployment
insurance was reduced for unemployment spells starting after 1st April 1997. This reform had
a large e®ect on the work incentives for employed and newly unemployed individuals aged
between 42-46, 49-51 and 54-56 years with su±ciently long pre-reform entitlement periods for
unemployment insurance.26 Figure 2 shows the average change in the entitlement period by age
caused by a move from the pre April 1997 regime to the post April 1997 regime. We also plot
the corresponding change in the maximum entitlement period. As explained above, the two
di®er because, regardless of age, individuals with short entitlement periods were not a®ected by
the reform. Moreover, we see a strong pattern in the mean change in the entitlement period by
age, with individuals aged under 42 years or over 61 years being una®ected and individuals aged
between 42-46, 49-51 and 54-56 years experiencing on average large reductions in entitlement.27
We exploit the quasi-experimental nature of this reform and use a di®erence-in-di®erences
procedure to show that the entitlement period for unemployment insurance has a signi¯cant
causal e®ect on labor market status. Parameter estimates from the di®erence-in-di®erences es-
25As shown in Table 2 in Appendix I, in February 2006 the design of unemployment insurance was again subject
to a major reform which reduced the maximum entitlement period to 18 months. Unfortunately we cannot exploit
this legislative change for identi¯cation since we observe individuals for only 7 quarters after the 2006 reform.
26Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007) evaluate the same April 1997 reform using quantile regression and ¯nd small
e®ects on the duration of unemployment, particularly for older unemployed individuals. Hunt (1995) exploits
earlier reforms of the German unemployment insurance system and using hazard rate models ¯nds that increases
in the entitlement period reduced exit rates from unemployment.
27Some individuals aged 47-48, 52-53 and 57-61 years were a®ected as the reform reduced their entitlement
period at younger ages and they carry forward this lower entitlement.
17Figure 2: Change in the mean observed and maximum entitlement period caused by a move
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timation provide additional moments for the structural estimation. We argue that identi¯cation
given these additional moments is cleaner and more transparent than just exploiting simple
correlations between labor market status and the entitlement period since the quasi-natural
experiment generates moments which are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity or other per-
sistent individual characteristics and therefore can be linked clearly to a causal e®ect. The
additional moments obtained from the quasi-experiment are particularly informative about the
importance of net income to individuals' labor supply behavior and therefore provide identify-
ing information about the parameters that determine the preference for consumption in the °ow
utilities.
In more detail, additional moments based on the quasi-experiment are obtained using a
di®erence-in-di®erences estimation procedure which captures variation in the intensity of the











the e®ect on individual i's entitlement period at time t of a move from the pre April 1997 regime
to the post 1997 regime. This di®erence is zero for individuals belonging to the control group
at time t, namely individuals whose entitlement period was una®ected either due to their age
or low pre reform entitlement period. Those whose entitlement period was a®ected at time t
are termed treated and for these individuals the change in the entitlement period varies by age
and employment history. In order to identify the causal e®ect of the duration of unemployment
insurance on labor market status we analyze separately the labor market transitions of employed









i;t )Postt + "i;j;t; (12)
where yi;j;t is an indicator of individual i being in labor market state j at time t, "i;j;t is an error
term and Postt is an indicator variable which equals one if the observation was made during the
18post 1997 regime and is zero otherwise. Additionally we include age dummies, quarterly time
dummies and measures of education and region of residence. ° re°ects the correlation between
labor market status as the change in the entitlement period caused by the 1997 reform that exists
due to the combined e®ects of experience, unobserved heterogeneity, and the entitlement period
itself, while ¸ measures the causal e®ect of the entitlement period on labor market status; an
estimate of ¸ that is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero implies that labor market status responds
to the entitlement period for those whose entitlement was a®ected by the April 1997 reform. As
we impose linearity, ¸ can be interpreted as the average e®ect of a one month increase in the
entitlement period for those individuals who actually experienced a change in their entitlement
period.
We make two further comments regarding this model. First, for the identi¯cation of the





i;t )Postt after partialling out the e®ects of the other variables in the model. This
assumption would fail to hold if at the time of the reform the persistence of the error term
changed di®erently for treated and control individuals, however this seems implausible. Second,
as we impose linearity in the e®ect of the treatment intensity on labor market status the model is
less °exible than a non-parametric speci¯cation using a full set of treatment dummies. However
this speci¯cation provides an e±cient way to use all of the variation in entitlement periods
generated by the reform, which is important given our relatively small sample size. Moreover,
the restrictive linearity assumption in the di®erence-in-di®erences estimation does not a®ect
the interpretation policy e®ects derived from the structural model, our preferred tool for policy
analysis.
We estimate eight di®erent speci¯cations of (12). Using a sample of individuals who were
employed in the last quarter, we run regressions for being employed and being retired in the
current quarter. This exercise is repeated instead using a sample of individuals who were un-
employed in the last quarter.28 These two regressions are implemented ¯rst constraining the
parameters ¸ and ° to be common to all individuals and then allowing these parameters to
vary by subgroups de¯ned according to education and region of residence. Table 1 shows the
estimated values of ¸, the coe±cient on the change in the entitlement period.
28As full-time employment, unemployment and retirement are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
there is no loss from omitting transitions into unemployment.
19Table 1: Percentage point e®ect of the entitlement period on transitions out of employment and
out of unemployment
Employment to Employment Unemployment Unemployment
to Retirement to Employment to Retirement to Employment
Estimation with common coe±cients
Common e®ect -0.126¤ -0.062 -0.013 0.842¤
(0.067) (0.176) (0.376) (0.491)
Estimation with subgroup speci¯c coe±cients
High education in west -0.133¤ 0.035 1.794 0.510
(0.066) (0.179) (1.623) (1.732)
High education in east -0.143¤ -0.014 -1.081¤ -1.502
(0.072) (0.404) (0.597) (1.215)
Low education in west -0.107¤ -0.111 -0.365 -0.847
(0.068) (0.234) (0.485) (0.639)
Low education in east -0.285¤¤ 0.321 0.008 -1.630¤¤
(0.128) (0.792) (0.216) (0.701)
Number of observations 13485 13485 4551 4551
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parenthesis. ¤¤ and ¤
indicate signi¯cance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. All regressions also include yearly age
and quarterly time dummies, controls for region of residence and education and the change in the
entitlement period caused by the April 1997 reform. High education is greater than 11 years and low
education is 11 or fewer years.
We ¯nd several cases in which the entitlement period has a signi¯cant e®ect on transitions
between labor market states. The results show that averaged over subgroups a reduction in the
entitlement period of one month increases the probability of a transition from employment to
retirement by 0.12 of a percentage point, and this e®ect is signi¯cant at the 7 percent level.
This e®ect is strongest for individuals residing in east Germany and is signi¯cant at the 5% level
for low educated east Germans. This result is in line with the above mentioned stepping stone
e®ect: a reduction in the generosity of unemployment insurance makes using unemployment as a
stepping stone into retirement less attractive and therefore employed individuals are more likely
to move directly into retirement. In contrast, the results show no signi¯cant e®ect of a change in
the entitlement period on the persistence in employment. For transitions out of unemployment,
we ¯nd roughly opposite results. An increase in the entitlement period signi¯cantly reduces
the probability of a highly educated east German moving into retirement, but has no e®ect on
movements into retirement for individuals in the other subgroups. On average a reduction in
the entitlement period of one month increases the probability of a transition into employment
by 0.89 of a percentage point and this e®ect is signi¯cant at the 8 percent level. This e®ect is
higher for the low educated and for individuals residing in east Germany. We use all twenty
parameter estimates shown in Table 1 as additional moments when estimating the structural
model.
206 Results
6.1 Structural parameter estimates
Table 2 shows the estimated values of the parameters appearing in the wage equation, the job
arrival and separation rates, preferences and the equation describing access to early retirement.
Estimates of the parameters characterizing the initial conditions are presented in Appendix IV.
Looking ¯rst at the wage equation, we see that log wages are concave in experience. This
¯nding underlines the importance of human capital accumulation for the wage process, and for
labor supply behavior over the life-cycle more generally. O®ered wages are found to be 40%
higher in west Germany than in the east, and native Germans and men receive signi¯cantly
higher wage o®ers than immigrants and women respectively. We estimate the rate of return to
one year of education to be 8%. The estimation results show no signi¯cant e®ect of persistent
unobserved characteristics on wages.
We ¯nd that older individuals, east Germans and those with health problems are relatively
unlikely to receive a job arrival and have relatively high job separation rates. We ¯nd signi¯cant
experience e®ects in the job arrival and separation rates which stresses the importance of ana-
lyzing life-cycle employment in a dynamic framework. The estimation results show signi¯cant
e®ects of unobserved characteristics on the job arrival and job separation rates and the unob-
servables a®ecting these two processes are found to be positively correlated. This implies that
individuals who are relatively likely to receive job arrivals also have relatively high separation
rates. In other words, such individuals have a fast rate of turnover on the labor market. As
expected, we ¯nd that the probability of having access to early retirement is increasing in age
and is positively related to having health problems.
The estimated value of ¯y reveals that individuals have a signi¯cantly positive preference
for consumption. We ¯nd that ´i, the individual speci¯c complementarity parameter, displays
signi¯cant variation over individuals. After allowing for the truncation of ´i from above at 1 and
below at 0, the mean value of ´i is 0.83. Ignoring transition costs, this implies that on average
the net reservation wage for full-time work is 20% higher than net income in unemployment.
We ¯nd signi¯cant costs of moving into employment. Speci¯cally, the cost of a move into
employment is estimated to be 65% of net income in unemployment which, based on an average
monthly net income in unemployment of 686 Euros, implies a one-o® transition cost of 445 Euros
associated with moving into employment. In contrast, we ¯nd no signi¯cant costs of moving
from employment into unemployment.




(Age ¡ 54)I(54 · Age < 59) -0.120 0.015
(Age ¡ 59)I(Age ¸ 59) 0.055 0.019
Health Problems -0.133 0.048
West 0.410 0.034
Experience (years)/10 0.350 0.027
Experience2 (years)/1000 -0.791 0.072
Education (years)/10 0.800 0.074
Male 0.112 0.030
German 0.070 0.047
Standard deviation of random e®ect in wages ¾®w 0.023 0.054
Standard deviation of transitory shocks to wages ¾À 0.131 0.012
Arrival rate
Intercept -4.508 0.319
(Age ¡ 40)I(40 · Age < 54) -0.220 0.211
(Age ¡ 54)I(54 · Age < 59) -0.150 0.096
(Age ¡ 59)I(Age ¸ 59) -0.496 0.172
Health Problems -0.166 0.314
West 1.095 0.306
Experience (years)/10 0.941 0.115
Standard deviation of random e®ect in arrivals ¾¹µ 1.600 0.096
Separation rate
Intercept -6.119 0.996
(Age ¡ 40)I(40 · Age < 54) -0.372 0.512
(Age ¡ 54)I(54 · Age < 59) 0.411 0.252
(Age ¡ 59)I(Age ¸ 59) 1.260 0.304
Health Problems 4.280 0.807
West -1.164 0.586
Experience (years)/10 -0.540 0.279
Standard deviation of random e®ect in separations ¾¹° 1.494 0.589
Covariance between random e®ects in arrivals and separations Cov¹µ¹° 2.087 0.883
Preferences
Cost of transition into employment cuf 0.656 0.081
Cost of transition into unemployment cfu 0.201 0.183
Mean of complementary parameter (before truncation) ¹´ 0.971 0.142
Standard deviation of complementarity parameter (before truncation) ¾´ 0.140 0.079
Coe±cient on consumption ¯y 4.043 1.287
Access to retirement
Intercept -1.500 0.165
(Age ¡ 54)I(54 · Age < 59) 0.050 0.046
(Age ¡ 59)I(59 · Age < 62) 0.161 0.103
(Age ¡ 62)I(Age ¸ 62) -0.037 0.126
Health Problems 0.530 0.297
Notes: The health process is de¯ned and estimated in Appendix II.
226.2 Goodness of ¯t
Figure 3 presents a graphical analysis of the model's goodness of ¯t. Employment, unemployment
and retirement over the life-cycle are predicted satisfactorily. The distribution of the simulated
log wages for individuals in employment in the quarter in which they were interviewed and
adjusted for survey non-response, matches accurately the distribution of sampled wages. Finally,
the general trends over the life-cycle in the exit rates from employment and unemployment are
captured by the model. As we observe only a relatively small number of transitions between
labor market states at a given age, the observed exit rates from employment and unemployment
are somewhat noisy. Therefore it is not surprising that we do not ¯t the exit rates as well as
other aspects of behavior.
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Table 3 provides information about the ¯t of moments derived from the di®erence-in-di®erences
estimation described in Section 5.2. In addition to the observed moments (repeated from Ta-
ble 1) we present the ¯tted counterparts and t-tests for the signi¯cance of the di®erence between
the ¯tted and observed moments. The table shows that the structural model ¯ts the di®erence-
in-di®erences moments fairly accurately. The t-statistics indicate that only in one case, namely
transitions from employment to retirement for low educated east Germans, is the di®erence
between the observed and the ¯tted moment signi¯cant at the 5% level. Since we observe very
few low educated east Germans making a transition from employment to retirement, this sig-
ni¯cant di®erence is not very surprising. The structural model is able to ¯t the causal e®ect
of unemployment insurance on transitions from unemployment to employment very accurately.
However, in general it seems that the structural model under predicts the e®ect of unemploy-
ment insurance on transitions from employment into retirement. We postulate this may be due
to our approximation to net income in retirement, described in Section 2.3.3, or to the structure
imposed on the °ow utilities, speci¯cally the restriction that the coe±cient on consumption, ¯y,
does not vary across labor market states.
23Table 3: Fit of the di®erence-in-di®erences moments
Employment to Employment Unemployment Unemployment
to Retirement to Employment to Retirement to Employment
Common e®ect
Fitted -0.035 -0.148 -0.047 -0.730
Observed -0.126 -0.062 -0.013 -0.842
t-test for di®erence 1.352 -0.481 -0.088 0.214
High education in west
Fitted -0.010 -0.170 0.129 -1.144
Observed -0.133 0.035 1.794 0.510
t-test for di®erence 1.821 -1.102 -0.941 -0.809
High education in east
Fitted -0.028 -0.047 -0.258 -0.447
Observed -0.143 -0.014 -1.081 -1.502
t-test for di®erence 1.472 -0.069 1.038 0.814
Low education west
Fitted -0.020 -0.191 0.152 -0.592
Observed -0.107 -0.111 -0.365 -0.847
t-test for di®erence 1.268 -0.337 0.992 0.371
Low education east
Fitted 0.013 -0.104 -0.517 -1.053
Observed -0.285 0.321 0.008 -1.630
t-test for di®erence 2.089 -0.437 -1.753 0.636
Notes: Observed moments are described in Table 1. t-tests are constructed using the
bootstrapped standard errors of the observed moments.
7 Policy analysis
7.1 Employment and ¯scal e®ects of the unemployment insurance
We use our estimates of the structural parameters to simulate the employment and ¯scal e®ects
of the unemployment insurance system. Speci¯cally, we explore the e®ects of: (i) a reduction
in the replacement ratio for ALG I from 60% to 55%; and (ii) a reduction in the maximum
entitlement period from 32 months to 12 months for all ages. We use the German 2001 tax
and transfer system as the benchmark. Table 4 summarizes the employment and ¯scal e®ects
of a reduction in the replacement ratio and in the entitlement period for particular groups
of individuals, de¯ned by employment status at age 40 years or by education and region of
residence. We report the e®ects at di®erent points in the life-cycle, namely at ages 41, 55 and
63 years.29
We focus ¯rst of the e®ects of a change in the replacement ratio. Averaged over the life-cycle
and over the sampled individuals, reducing the replacement ratio to 55% leads to a fall in the net
transfers made by the government, including additional tax revenues received by the government
due to higher employment rates, of around 5 Euros per person per month. Overall we ¯nd that
a reduction in the replacement ratio to 55% leads to a fall in unemployment, however the e®ect
varies strongly by age. Whereas the average reductions in unemployment at ages 41 and 55
years are only 0.4 and 0.1 of a percentage point respectively, the reduction in unemployment is
1.55 percentage points at the end of the working life. In line with previous results for Germany,
29In a similar fashion, we could use our model to evaluate the 2006 reform of unemployment insurance in
Germany (described in Table 7). Using a hazard rate model, Schmitz and Steiner (2007) ¯nd that the 2001
reform had large e®ects on the employment behavior of older individuals.
24e.g., Hunt (1995), we ¯nd that the primary behavioral e®ect of a reduction in the generosity of
employment insurance it to cause older unemployed individuals to move into retirement.
For individuals who were unemployed without entitlement for unemployment insurance at
age 40 years a reduction in the generosity of unemployment insurance has no e®ect on labor
market status at age 41 years and there is a positive e®ect on unemployment at age 55 years.
This ¯nding is consistent with Mortensen's entitlement e®ect, whereby unemployed individuals
with zero entitlement have a reduced incentive to enter employment when the generosity of
unemployment insurance is reduced.30 For individuals in this group, at age 63 years we ¯nd no
e®ect on employment but retirement increases by 0.37 of a percentage point.
For employed individuals with below full entitlement at age 40 years we again ¯nd that
cutting the replacement ratio increases the probability of unemployment at age 55 years which
is consistent with the entitlement e®ect. In contrast, for employed individuals with full enti-
tlement at age 40 years a reduction in the replacement ratio has the expected negative e®ect
on unemployment at all ages, and in line with the legally determined maximum entitlement
period increasing in age, the e®ect is largest at age 63 years. We ¯nd very little variation in
the labor supply e®ects of a cut in the replacement ratio across subgroups de¯ned by education
and region of residence, but we note that the average ¯scal saving is greatest for the group of
high educated west Germans. This result re°ects the dependence of unemployment insurance
bene¯ts on previous earnings together with the relatively high wages of west Germans with high
education.
We now turn to the e®ect of cutting the legally de¯ned maximum entitlement period to 12
months for all ages. This reform has no direct e®ect on the entitlement periods of those aged
under 42 years, but reduces the maximum entitlement period by between 2 and 20 months for
older individuals. Individuals aged 57 years and above are the group most severely a®ected
by this reform. Although a reduction in the maximum entitlement period to 12 months has no
direct e®ect on the transfers paid to those aged under 42 years these individuals may adjust their
labor market behavior as they anticipate experiencing a reduction in their maximum entitlement
period once they reach 42 years of age.
The results in Table 4 show that on average cutting the maximum entitlement period to 12
months produces a ¯scal saving of around 8 Euros per person per month and leads to larger
labor supply e®ects than those obtained by cutting the replacement ratio to 55%. We see some
small labor supply e®ects at age 41 years, arising from individuals adjusting labor supply in
anticipation of lower maximum entitlement periods in the future. At age 55 years we ¯nd a
small positive e®ect on unemployment for individuals who had zero entitlement at age 41 years,
which again may be partly driven by the entitlement e®ect. This is not the case for those who
were employed with full entitlement at age 40 years. Interestingly, and in contrast to the e®ect
of a cut in the replacement ratio, at age 63 years we ¯nd that a reduction in the maximum
entitlement period to 12 months has a large positive e®ect on employment, while on average
30Unlike Mortensen (1977), in our model reductions in the generosity of unemployment insurance may cause
non-entitlement unemployed individuals to be more or less likely enter employment due to the e®ects of experience
and the option of early retirement. Therefore the negative labor supply e®ects evident in Table 4 do not re°ect



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26retirement increases by only 0.53 of a percentage point. This large employment e®ect towards
the end of the working life contributes to the relative large ¯scal saving associated this reduction
in the maximum entitlement period.
A comparison of the employment and ¯scal e®ects induced by a cut in the replacement
ratio and by a cut in the maximum entitlement period suggests recommending the entitlement
period over the replacement ratio as a policy tool. A similar policy conclusion was reached in
Lalive et al. (2006) in the context of Austria. Based on regional and intertemporal variation
in the design of unemployment insurance, Lalive et al. (2006) identify the causal e®ects of the
replacement ratio and the entitlement period on the duration of unemployment using a reduced
form model. They conclude that the entitlement period is a more e®ective tool for policy makers
than the replacement ratio, primarily because labor supply behavior is more sensitive to changes
in the entitlement period.
7.2 Revenue neutral employment and welfare e®ects
When conducting policy evaluations based on structural models it is possible to go beyond an
analysis of employment e®ects and to provide evidence about the welfare implications of policy
reforms. Based on the results of structural modeling we can address central questions for policy
makers concerning the gainers and losers from tax reforms, the size of welfare e®ects in monetary
terms or the design of the optimal tax and transfer system. However, answering such questions
would take us well beyond a positive analysis and require normative assumptions about the
social welfare function. In this paper we work with a very simple social welfare measure in
order to minimize normative assumptions. Speci¯cally, we interpret the individual speci¯c value
functions as measures of individual well-being over the remainder of the life-cycle and look only
at the proportions of individuals made better o® and worse o® by revenue neutral reforms to the
tax and transfer system.31 By looking at revenue neutral reforms we hold ¯xed the position of
the government, and by focusing on whether individuals are made worse or better o® in terms
of their value function we avoid any interpersonal comparisons.
We analyze seven alternative unemployment insurance schemes which vary in the replacement
ratio and the entitlement period. These parameters are listed in the ¯rst two columns of Table 5.
In order to make the reforms revenue neutral we adjust income taxation proportionately, and
the size of the income tax reduction is presented in column three. We hold the rest of the tax
and transfer system, including the means-tested out-of-work transfers, constant and use the 2001
tax and transfer system as the benchmark. Table 5 further shows the changes in employment,
unemployment and retirement induced by each reform and age speci¯c percentages of gainers
and losers as measured at three di®erent points during the life-cycle. In all reforms, individuals
gain from lower income tax when they are in employment but may be worse o® if they are
unemployed. Whether the value function increase or decreases depends on the balance of these
countervailing e®ects in expectation over the remainder of the life-cycle.
31Obviously this measure has limitations. For example we cannot derive conclusions about the size of welfare
e®ects or the distribution of gainers and losers.
27Table 5: Welfare e®ects of revenue neural reductions in the replacement rate and
entitlement period
Maximum Replacement % change in income tax Labor supply e®ects
Entitlement Ratio to obtain revenue neutrality f u r
Period (%) (%) (%) (%)
6 60 -6.41 1.01 -1.26 0.25
12 60 -4.06 0.72 -0.84 0.12
18 60 -2.50 0.49 -0.54 0.05
6 55 -6.56 0.98 -1.34 0.36
12 55 -4.61 0.76 -1.04 0.28
18 55 -3.44 0.59 -0.81 0.21
32 55 -2.19 0.35 -0.44 0.09
Age 40 years Age 55 years Age 63 years
better o® worse o® better o® worse o® better o® worse o®
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
6 60 65.31 31.49 32.08 62.03 26.03 67.17
12 60 93.41 3.36 34.42 59.35 28.65 63.62
18 60 95.18 1.58 42.02 51.64 33.74 57.78
6 55 60.71 36.09 30.19 63.98 24.49 68.91
12 55 67.10 29.67 28.19 65.66 23.78 68.89
18 55 68.08 28.69 26.71 67.08 22.63 69.58
32 55 60.49 36.28 35.69 58.04 29.09 61.76
Notes: Figures under f, u and r denote the percentage point changes in full-time employment,
unemployment and retirement respectively averaged over sampled individuals and over age.
Welfare e®ects are based on changes in individual value functions for the sampled individuals.
Retired individuals are neither worse o® or better o®, provided that their pensions were not
altered by the policy change.
Looking at the ¯rst three policies in Table 5, where the entitlement period is cut but the
replacement ratio is held ¯xed at 60%, we see that cutting the entitlement period to 6 months,
which a®ects entitled individuals of all ages, allows income tax payments to be reduced by 6.4%.
This reform causes a one percentage point increase in employment, averaged over the sample
individuals and over age. According to our welfare measure we ¯nd that 63% of individuals
aged 40 years are better o® due to these changes. Cutting the maximum entitlement period
to 12 or 18 months leads to smaller increases in employment and allows smaller reductions in
income tax. Following these two reforms, individuals aged 40 years bene¯t from lower income
tax payments in the current period and lower expected payments in the future, while at age 40
years cutting the maximum entitlement period to 12 or 18 months reduces life-cycle utility only
to the extent to which future expected net income in unemployment is reduced. Thus, as the
negative consequences of these reforms are delayed until later in the life-cycle, at age 40 years
over 90% of individuals are better o® following these reforms.
Cutting the replacement ratio to 55% but holding the maximum entitlement period ¯xed at
32 months produces a smaller increase in employment and, as measured at age 40 years, makes
fewer individuals better o® than reforms in which only the maximum entitlement period is cut.
Moreover, cutting simultaneously the entitlement period and the replacement ratio produces
similar increases in employment to those obtained by cutting only the entitlement period, but
tends to make fewer individuals better o®. In line with our previous ¯ndings, these results
provide further support for cutting the entitlement period rather than the replacement ratio if
the government is aiming to reduce the generosity of unemployment insurance.
28In all reform scenarios the fraction of individual made better o® is declining with age. This
can be explained by two factors. First, older individuals are more likely to be subject to a job
separation and receive fewer job o®ers. Older individuals therefore have a higher probability of
being unemployed and the expected loss from less generous unemployment insurance bene¯ts is
relatively high. Second, the maximum entitlement period is increasing with age and therefore
reductions in the generosity a®ect older individuals more than younger individuals.
8 Conclusion
The design of unemployment insurance is an important question for policy makers and has
implications for employment and retirement behavior over the life-cycle. In this study we have
developed a dynamic structural life-cycle model with su±cient generality and richness to allow
us to evaluate the employment, ¯scal and welfare e®ects induced by unemployment insurance.
Critically, our model captures accurately the working incentives presented by the tax and transfer
system, and includes unemployment insurance bene¯ts that may depend on an individual's
working and earnings history. Structural modeling allows us to conduct policy analysis that
goes beyond numerous empirical evaluations analyzing the employment e®ects of unemployment
insurance using reduced form, typically quasi-experimental, methods. The model is estimated
using German panel data from the SOEP covering an fairly homogeneous sample of single adult
households. The structural parameters are estimated using MSM and we improve identi¯cation
by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment which reduced the maximum entitlement period for
unemployment insurance for individuals with certain age and employment history credentials.
Overall, we ¯nd that a reduction in the generosity of unemployment insurance leads to a
fall in unemployment which is matched partly by higher employment and partly by increased
early retirement. Not surprisingly, we predict the largest labor supply responses for individuals
older than 60 years as the unemployment insurance rules are most generous for this age group,
and a relative large fraction of such individuals are unemployed. Our results are consistent with
Mortensen's entitlement e®ect as we predict an increase in unemployment for individuals without
entitlement when generosity of unemployment insurance is reduced. Cutting the replacement
ratio leads to slightly lower employment e®ects and to a smaller reduction in net government
transfers than cutting the entitlement period. In this respect our results support previous
¯ndings suggesting that changing the entitlement period is a more e®ective policy tool than
adjusting the replacement ratio.
Finally, we draw on the speci¯cation on preferences embedded in the structural model and
conduct a simple analysis of welfare. The results indicate again that cuts in the entitlement
period are preferred to cuts in the replacement ratio and further we ¯nd that there is little
to be gained, either in terms of welfare or in increased employment, from adjusting both the
replacement ratio and the entitlement period. Of course this ¯nal part of our analysis is subject
to critiques of our chosen welfare measure, as will always be the case when attempting to
aggregate measures of individual well-being. Indeed the welfare analysis is presented more to
illustrate the added leverage that can be obtained by analyzing unemployment insurance in a
29structural model than as a de¯nitive answer as to the welfare implications of di®erent systems
of unemployment insurance.
Appendix I: The German tax and transfer system
This appendix describes the key elements of the German tax and transfer system and how we
implement the legislation in the setting of a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply. Although
the general structure of income taxation, social security contributions and transfers was un-
changed over the years 1995 - 2007, several reforms a®ected the progressivity and generosity of
this system.
Social Security Contributions (SSC)
In each month, an individual's income from employment is subject to social security deductions
for health, unemployment and pension bene¯ts.32 As shown in columns 2-4 of Table 6, except
for unemployment insurance, the rates for SSC increased slightly over time. Social security
contributions are capped, and the upper level of monthly earnings subject to SSC is higher in
west Germany than in the east (5200 Euros compared to 4500 Euros in 2005).
Table 6: Key parameters of the German tax and transfer system
Social Security Contributions Income taxation ALG II
Health Pension Unemployment Tax Top Marginal Average Average
Year Insurance Insurance Insurance Allowance Tax Rate West East
(%) (%) (%) per year (%) per month per month
1995 7 9.3 3.3 4050 53 564 553
1996 7.5 9.65 3.3 6021 53 571 560.5
1997 7.75 10.15 3.3 6021 53 580 569.5
1998 7.75 10.15 3.3 6156 53 586 575
1999 7.75 9.85 3.3 6507 53 594 584
2000 7.75 9.85 3.3 6876 51 606 596
2001 7.75 9.55 3.3 7200 48.5 617 606
2002 7.75 9.75 3.3 7200 48.5 629 617
2003 8 9.75 3.3 7200 48.5 634 622
2004 8 9.75 3.3 7632 45 643 631
2005 8.5 9.75 3.3 7632 42 653 637
2006 8.5 9.75 3.3 7632 42 658 642
2007 8.5 9.75 2.1 7632 42
¤ 662 645
¤ From 2007, taxable income above 250000 Euros per year has been taxed at a rate of 45%.
Notes: All payments are given in Euros. The rates of the SSC describe only the employee's
share. The employer contributes the same amount. ALG II payments include housing
bene¯ts.
Income taxation
In contrast to SSC, income tax is computed on an annual basis and at the household level. An
individual's annual taxable income is de¯ned as the sum of gross income from employment above
an exemption threshold, gross income from assets above a disregard and income from renting.
32In addition to the employee's SSC, the employer contributes about the same amount in SSC. Since July 2005
there has been a small divergence from this rule which we neglect in this study.
30Moreover SSC up to a maximum amount are deducted. An individual's annual income tax liabil-
ity is obtained by applying the income tax function to taxable income. The income tax function
is a smooth function of taxable income above a further exemption threshold. The exemption
threshold increased between 1995 and 2006 while, over the same period, the top marginal tax
rate decreased from 53% to 42% (see Table 6). In addition to income tax, individuals pay an
extra tax (Solidaritaetszuschlag) to ¯nance the cost of German reuni¯cation. This extra tax
was decreased in 1998 from 7.5% to 5.5% of income tax payments.
Transfer system
As described in Section 2.3.2, transfers to unemployed individuals consist of unemployment
insurance, in the form of either ALG I or ALH, or means-tested social assistance (ALG II).
Table 7 shows the maximum entitlement period for unemployment insurance over time by age.
The maximum entitlement period is increasing in age, and has been shortened over time.
Table 7: Maximum entitlement period over time by age
Age (years) until April 1997 from April 1997 until Jan 2006 since Feb 2006
< 42 12 12 12
42-43 18 12 12
44 22 12 12
45-46 22 18 12
47-48 22 22 12
49-51 26 22 12
52-53 26 26 12
54 32 26 12
55-56 32 26 18
¸ 57 32 32 18
Notes: Adapted from Schmitz and Steiner (2007).
In contrast to unemployment insurance, the amount of ALG II, or social assistance, does
not depend on previous earnings. Entitlement rules are independent of working history and the
transfer is permanent. The transfer consists of a person-related part that varies by region of
residence and housing bene¯ts that may vary by individual. However, housing bene¯ts only
guarantee a reasonable apartment given the number of household numbers. In the last two
columns of Table 6 we provide information about the average monthly bene¯t payments by year
in east and west Germany.
Note the ALG II is means-tested against income from all sources. Thus, if the ALG I
bene¯ts for an eligible unemployed individual are lower than the ALG II bene¯ts then he or
she receives, in addition to ALG I, the di®erence between the two transfers. Unemployment
insurance transfers are not directly taxed. Instead, ALG I and ALH are added to taxable
income to determine the individual's average tax rate, which is then applied to taxable income
to determine the individual's tax liability. ALG II payments have no tax implications.
Implementation
Income tax is based on annual income. However we model labor supply decisions at quarterly
intervals. In our implementation of the German tax and transfer system we calculate net income
31in the current quarter based on an annualized version of the individual's income in the current
quarter. The procedure assumes implicitly that individuals base their labor supply decision in
the current quarter on their net income relating to their current gross income and ignore any
adjustments in taxes and transfer pertaining to income received previously in the ¯scal year.
Additionally we assume full take-up of bene¯ts.
Appendix II: Estimation of the health equation
Health is an important state variable in the structural model as health a®ects job arrivals, job
separations, wages and the probability of having access to early retirement. It is well known
that health status varies considerably over the life-cycle and health problems are often very
persistent. Therefore, we model health status over the life-cycle using a dynamic model. At
time t we measure health with an indicator variable, Health Problemsi;t, which takes value one
if the individual reports health problems and is zero otherwise. We assume that health status
evolves stochastically over the life-cycle according to the following equation
Health Problemsi;t(Health Problemsi;t¡1;gi;t;Ái;t) = ¼1Health Problemsi;t¡1+¼2gi;t+Ái;t; (13)
where gi;t consists of individual characteristics that impact on health, including education and
age. Health status in the previous quarter, Health Problemsi;t¡1, captures persistence in health
status. The unobservable Ái;t is assumed to occur independently over both individuals and time
and to have a standard normal distribution. Given these distributional assumptions, estimation
of the parameters in (13) can be conducted prior to estimation of the structural parameters and
the parameters describing the initial conditions.
The sampled individuals were asked to record their health status only in the quarter when
the annual survey took place. A standard probit model cannot therefore be used to estimate the
parameters in (13) as health status in the previous quarter, Health Problemsi;t¡1, is unobserved.
Instead we use the MSM to estimate the unknown parameters. The moments used in this
estimation procedure consist of coe±cients from an OLS regression of observed health status
on the previous observation of health status, Health Problemsi;t¡4, and observed individual
characteristics. Additionally the list of moments includes the proportions of individuals whose
health remained good, remained poor and changed from good to poor between adjacent surveys.
Table 8 reports the MSM parameter estimates. The coe±cient on health status in the
previous quarter is positive and highly signi¯cant indicating strong persistence in health status
on a quarter by quarter basis. Additionally we see that health tends to decline with age but
improves with experience and education. Ceteris paribus, men are more likely to have health
problems than women.
32Table 8: Estimates of parameters in the health equation
Coe±cient Standard Error
Health Problemst¡1 4.122 0.129
(Age-40)/10 0.210 0.041
Education (years)/10 -0.206 0.048
West -0.008 0.052
Male 0.119 0.045
Experience (years)/10 -0.100 0.027
Intercept -2.091 0.034
Appendix III: Chosen moments
Table 9 describes the moments that we use in the MSM estimation of the parameters appearing in
the structural model and the initial conditions. In the ¯rst column we describe how we construct
each set of moments, the second column shows the number of moments in each set, and in the
¯nal column we indicate which parameters are primarily identi¯ed by each set of moments. In
total we use 301 moments to estimate at total of 59 parameters. The largest fraction of the
moments are age and quarter speci¯c means of labor market outcomes, including measures of
the initial state. Further, we construct several moments which describe the persistence in wages
and in labor supply behavior. These moments provide identifying information about transition
costs and the persistent unobservables. In order to identify the e®ects of age and observed
characteristics in the various equations, we run several OLS regressions of outcome variables,
including wages and transitions between labor market states, on age and observed individual
characteristics.





Regression of employment on initial employment state and
initial experience
2
Variance of complementarity between
consumption and leisure (¾´)
Regression of the individual speci¯c number of transitions
from unemployment to employment on initial employment
state, initial experience, initial entitlement period, region,
initial health and age terms
10
Variance of the individual speci¯c un-
observable (¾
2
¹µ) and coe±cients on ob-
served characteristics in the job arrival
rate
Regression of the individual speci¯c number of transitions
from employment to unemployment on initial employment
state, initial experience, initial entitlement period, region,
initial health and age terms
10
Variance of the individual speci¯c un-
observable (¾
2
¹°) and coe±cients on ob-
served characteristics in the job separa-
tion rate
Regression of initial employment on initial experience, ini-
tial health, region, education, functions of initial non-labor
income, nationality, children, martial status and age terms
15
Parameters determining initial employ-
ment
Regression of initial retirement on age terms 5
Parameters determining initial retire-
ment
Regression of transitions from unemployment to employment
on experience, health, entitlement period, region, and age
terms
11 Parameters determining job arrivals
Regression of transitions from unemployment to retirement
on experience, health, entitlement period, region, and age
terms
11
Parameters determining access to early
retirement
Regression of transitions from employment to unemployment
on experience, health, entitlement period, region, and age
terms
10
Parameters determining job separa-
tions
Regression of transitions from employment to retirement on
experience, health, entitlement period, region, and age terms
10
Parameters determining access to early
retirement
Treatment e®ects obtained from regressions of transition be-
tween labor market states on the change in entitlement pe-
riod caused by 1997 unemployment insurance reform (see
Equation (12) and Table 1)
20 Coe±cient on consumption (¯y)
Regression of log wages on experience, health, initial em-
ployment, initial experience, region, education, nationality,
gender and age terms
15 Parameters determining wages
Distribution of log wages: percentiles; standard deviation;
autocorrelations
7 Unobservables a®ecting wages
Correlation between individual speci¯c number of transition
into and out of employment
1
Covariance between unobservables in
arrivals and separations (Cov¹µ¹°)
Persistence in labor market status: frequencies of various
sequences of transitions
18 State dependence e®ects
Labor supply over the life-cycle: quarterly employment and
retirement rates; age speci¯c employment and retirement
rates
156 Age e®ects
Notes: Region is an indicator of the individual residing is west Germany. Health is an indicator of the individual
having health problems. Gender is a dummy for male. Education refers to years of eduction. The chosen
functions of initial non-labor income are indicators of annual non-labor income being positive but less than 400
Euros per year and being above 400 Euros per year. Nationality is an indicator of being a native German.
Children and marital status are indicators of the individual having dependent children or having been married
prior to entering the sample.
34Appendix IV: Initial conditions
To complete the description of the estimation results, Table 10 presents the coe±cients appearing
in the initial conditions. These parameters are descriptive of individuals' behavior prior to their
entering the sample, and therefore do not have a structural interpretation. The coe±cients on
the persistent unobservables capture the endogeneity of the initial conditions.
Table 10: Estimates of parameters describing the initial conditions
Initial employment Initial retirement
Coe±cient Standard error Coe±cient Standard error
Intercept 1.665 0.481 -3.000 0.071
I(54 · Age < 59) 0.280 0.305 0.293 0.323
I(59 · Age) -0.679 0.303 1.156 0.123
Experience (years)/10 -0.400 0.080
Health Problems -2.080 0.214
Persistent unobserved individual e®ect in wages -4.991 0.611
Persistent unobserved individual e®ect in preferences 0.885 0.181
Persistent unobserved individual e®ect in separation rate -0.220 0.210
Persistent unobserved individual e®ect in arrival rate 0.219 0.242
West 3.220 0.503
Education (years)/10 2.504 0.518
I(0 < Non-labor income (Euros/year) · 400) 3.686 0.569
I(Non-labor income (Euros/year) > 400) 4.443 0.601
Male -0.187 0.387
German -0.092 0.264
Previously had children -0.855 0.397
Previously been Married -0.662 0.349
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